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SPATIAL LEGACIES OF DECEMBER AND  
THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 1 
Antonis Vradis & Dimitris Dalakoglou 
What grounds gave birth to December’s revolt and most importantly, 
what new grounds has the revolt given birth to in return? The political 
background of the events of those days and their repercussions are dis-
cussed extensively in the next part of this book.
2
 What we have tried to 
do here is to take a look at the actual, physical grounds of the uprising 
and its legacies—to read it, that is, through its inscription in the urban 
space of the city of Athens. To look at urban struggles in new sites of 
confrontation that have opened up there since; everyday reminders that 
December lives. 
But why is the site of the uprising important and why should we 
concern ourselves with its spatial legacies? It is easy enough to answer 
this question—after all, the spontaneous gathering of thousands at the 
scene of the police killing in the neighbourhood and the reverberation of 
the protests across Greece and around the globe were driven by two main 
factors. First, the near-instant spread of the news of the police killing was 
made possible by grassroots media and particularly by independent media 
websites;
3
 only hours after the assassination, impromptu demonstrations 
began taking place in dozens of cities inside and outside of Greece. 
Second, though, and perhaps most importantly, there was the political 
symbolism associated with the location of the murder of Alexis 
Grigoropoulos. Exarcheia is adjacent to the Athens Polytech 77 
nic, the epicentre of the anti-dictatorial student uprising of 1973 and 
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the place where acts of political dissent and unrest in the country’s post-
dictatorial era (1974–present) have been centred since. The site of the 
ignition of the revolt was equally important to the breathtaking speed with 
which it spread. 
The December uprising quickly became the focal point for an 
emerging radical movement. At the same time, it also became a refer-
ence point for both state authorities and reactionary non-state actors. 
Both have reconfigured their strategies in the process of confronting 
an empowered and confident radical social movement in the country. 
Beginning in the immediate post-revolt period (from early 2009 on-
ward) the two sides in December’s conflict have produced new 
relationships to public space as expressions of their own political 
identities and strategies. These new urban spatial practices are the main 
subject of our chapter. More precisely we consider the socio-spatial 
dynamics of two urban sites that emerged in Athens in the aftermath of 
the 2008 uprising: one, the self-organised Navarinou Park, born in 
March 2009 in Exarcheia; and two, the Ayios Panteleimonas Square, 
only a few kilometres away. Members of the neo-Nazi group Chrysi 
Avgi (Golden Dawn) have been attempting to establish since May 2009 
a “migrant-free” zone in explicit cooperation with the police force 
permanently stationed in the area. 
The conflicts at these small urban sites can only be seen as de-
riving from and at the same time reflecting wider social dynamics. We 
offer some thoughts on these two examples in the context of what has 
become an important current within social struggles in the metropolises of 
the West, including segments of the “social antagonist movement,” within 
which we place ourselves. We are talking about struggles for “the right to 
the city” (RtC): by placing our two examples alongside both 
contemporary debates about the RtC and the original conception by Henri 
Lefebvre we suggest that these place-specific struggles can help us 
rethink the “right to the city” altogether. 
A SANDBOX OF FREEDOM 
On the morning of 7 March 2009, a mass of people armed with shovels 
and plants marched through the central Athens district of Exarcheia. 
They were heading for an abandoned parking lot just a few yards from 
where Alexandros Grigoropoulos was murdered. Breaking the asphalt 
surface of the lot, they quickly replaced it with plants. In the digging 
78 and planting that followed, the first self-organised park of central Ath-  
ens was born thanks to the combined efforts of experienced activists, 
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new activists politicized during the events of December, and “ordinary” 
local residents. But these are no ordinary times and this is most certainly 
not an ordinary neighbourhood: Exarcheia has a long radical tradition, 
partly due to the presence of the Athens Polytechnic and some premises 
of the University of Athens in its vicinity. Relatively cheap housing has 
historically allowed students, intellectuals, radical political groups, 
bookshops, and affordable eateries to thrive in the area. As the centre of 
the city’s intellectual and political activity, the neighbourhood has long 
been a hotbed of radical action too. For the greater part of the country’s 
post-dictatorial era both media and popular discourses have 
characterized Exarcheia as the heart of anarchist activity in Athens. In 
the coverage of the events of December 2008 alone, Exarcheia was 
portrayed as anything from a “volatile district”
4
 and an area that “an-
archists regard as their fortress,”
5
 to “Athens’s answer to Harlem”
6
 and 
even a “ghetto.”
7
 
Yet for all the area’s history and potential, it was not until after 
December 2008 that the Exarcheiots would dare attempt such a bold 
appropriation of public space, transforming it into a meeting point for the 
people of the neighbourhood—green and public space of a kind 
notoriously lacking in Greek cities. The park’s organising assembly (a 
loose but regular gathering of people interested in running the space) 
explicitly traces its origin to December’s uprising. People in the area 
often call the park “December’s park,” not only because it is close to the 
point where Grigoropoulos was assassinated, but also because the park 
would not have been born without the collective empowerment and 
confidence gained for radical activities in the aftermath of the revolt. 
Since March 2009, this experiment in freedom has seen a wide variety of 
local residents, individuals, and various radical political groups (many of 
whom played a key role in the December events) come together, 
overcome long-standing sectarian divisions, and use the new space for 
concerts, film screenings, meetings and info-nights, exhibitions and 
festivals. The open-air space has provided unprecedented visibility for 
many political groups: for example, the curious onlooker can stop and 
take a peek at the regular public screenings organised by the Haunt of 
Albanian Migrants, whose declaration of participation in the uprising 
was exemplary of December’s spirit.
8
 Besides such public events, people 
continue to gather almost weekly in order to carry out the work necessary 
for the maintenance of the park, which has also received positive 
coverage in some mainstream media.
9
 
One year after the uprising, the “Self-Organised Navarinou 79 
Park” hosted a three-day event about the revolt. Similarly, several other 
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December-related protests, like the demonstrations in solidarity with the 
hunger-striker Iliopoulos (arrested in December 2008) started or ended 
there. This little park has become a new base of struggle for post-De-
cember grassroots political activities in Exarcheia and beyond. It is not 
surprising, then, that it has itself become an object of struggle: in the eyes 
of the authorities the park is an emblematic child of December, which 
continues to inspire various anti-authoritarian activities and must therefore 
be suppressed. In the first twelve months of its existence alone, the park 
had already claimed at least three major police raids (under both the 
conservative Nea Dimokratia government and, since their ascent to power 
in October 2009, the social democrats of PASOK). During these raids, 
police in full riot gear stormed the park and arrested and beat those who 
happened to be there at the time. Merely being present in the park has 
become a political act—and a punishable one at that. 
WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO THE SQUARE 
This direct and violent suppression of the Navarinou Park coincided 
with the emergence of another space operating on completely anti-
thetical principles. In May 2009, a mere two kilometres away in the 
neighbourhood of Ayios Panteleimonas, members of the neo-Nazi group 
Golden Dawn—along with right-wing populist partners—started visibly 
organising.
10
 The area, which together with Exarcheia stands among the 
most centrally located residential zones of Athens, had seen a recent 
influx of migrants—many of Afghan origin. Most ended up there 
after having been pushed out of the more tourist-oriented central areas 
of the city by police “cleansing” operations in the lead-up to the 2004 
Olympics. Anything deemed “dirty” by authorities, from stray dogs to 
undocumented or homeless migrants, street vendors, and drug users, 
was to be eliminated from public view. 
Four years after the Olympic spectacle, neo-Nazis hijacked the 
area’s so-called “local resident committee,” an organisation that had been 
founded sometime earlier by residents of various political backgrounds. 
But this political diversity was soon pushed out as neo-Nazis— many 
living in other areas of the city—took control as of November 2008. It 
was at that time that they organised their first protests against what they 
claimed was the supposed occupation of their neighbourhood by 
clandestine migrants. Gathering at the Ayios Panteleimonas Square, the 
neo-Nazis argued that migrants without papers, the recent 
80 riots, self-organised parks, and all such things disorderly had to be con-  
fronted directly by so-called ordinary citizens. Members of Golden 
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Dawn envision a system of authoritarian rule that would make urban 
areas “ethnically and politically clean” through mass deportations of 
migrants and other means. Their aim was to rid the area of “undesir-
ables,” particularly the migrants who had found refuge there after the 
Olympic pogroms of 2004. What the Nazis lacked in numbers they 
quickly made up in support from authorities. Police-backed Nazi patrols 
ensured that the square’s playground was locked up in order to prevent 
migrants’ children from using it. A local church—located by the square 
itself—was forced to stop providing free meals to local migrants out of 
fear after direct neo-Nazi threats against the church’s head priest. 
On 26 May 2009, “persons unknown” set fire to the church’s 
basement, where the priest had been offering shelter to homeless mi-
grants. Weeks later, a parent who tried to break the siege of the play-
ground along with his five-year-old son was physically attacked by 
neo-Nazis; police arrested the parent for “provocative behaviour”  and 
detained him for hours in the local police department, which was be-
sieged by a mob of a few dozen members of the “Ayios Panteleimonas 
Resident Committee” who threatened to lynch him. Throughout the 
summer of 2009 a number of anti-fascist demonstrations entered the 
square and temporarily opened up the playground only to be tear-gassed 
and pushed back by police units. In July 2009, the then-ViceMinister of 
Public Order Christos Markoyannakis visited the square and met with 
the neo-Nazi-led resident committee—never hiding his sympathy for 
their extreme right-wing politics. Only minutes after the meeting ended, 
a small group of neo-Nazis left the square and headed for the nearby 
Villa Amalias squat only to be outnumbered and chased away by those 
defending one of Athens’s oldest squatted buildings. 
At the time of this writing (late 2010), the square is still ef -
fectively under neo-Nazi control. The playground is locked up, the 
“Ayios Panteleimonas Resident Committee” still organises its own anti -
migrant patrols, and riot police units are still permanently stationed by 
the square to provide assistance in preserving their authoritarian rule. 
Throughout the past year, stories have surfaced in mainstream media 
about ruthless attacks on migrants in the neighbourhood. In late August 
2009, a local Afghan shopkeeper was forced to close his café early in the 
evening “so that migrants would not mingle around it.” The police have 
refused to take testimonies from migrants who have been assaulted.
11
 
The soothing words of the then-social-democratic Minister of Citizen 
Protection
12
 (who called the situation around Ayios Panteleimonas 
Square “scary” in October 2009) have not been accom  81 
panied by any concrete changes on the ground. 
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Contrary to the relatively unchanged situation in Ayios Pan-
teleimonas, the Exarcheia neighbourhood quickly felt in its bone the 
rise of the social-democratic PASOK government in October 2009. 
From the government’s second day in power, the area was besieged by 
police. The new government’s intention became evident not only in the 
repeated raids on the Navarinou Park but also—and especially—in the 
daily siege of the entire neighbourhood in those days: restrictions on 
the free flow of people in and out, constant ID checks of passersby, 
random detentions, forced detouring of people, etc. Yet the most 
important aspect of the Exarcheia operations after PASOK’s rise to 
power has been played out at the level of representation. One only has 
to take a glimpse at mass media coverage of these operations to realise 
that the new government sought to simultaneously occupy the physical 
and representational space of the neighbourhood. 
Bolstered by these media distortions, the new government took 
things as far as claiming that Exarcheia was en route to becoming a 
“Greek Montmartre”
13
 (as then Deputy Minister of Citizen Protection 
Spyros Vougias had put it). Its interventions in Exarcheia were intended 
to demonstrate a capacity to enforce order and a containment of the ri-
otous spirit of December 2008. This representational project has been 
aimed at two target audiences: one, a conservative segment that was to 
appreciate the state’s show of force in the physical presence of police on 
the streets of this famously unruly neighbourhood; and two, the anarchist 
and leftist activists who, according to media representations, concentrate 
themselves exclusively in Exarcheia. The idea, it seems, has been to 
reassure the conservative parts of society by intimidating those who 
would dare to continue to resist after December. 
THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 
State repression aside, what is it that remains of an urban uprising after 
the dust settles? What can the cases of Navarinou Park and the square of 
Ayios Panteleimonas tell us about the articulation of an uprising’s 
legacy through the new and more permanent sites of political 
confrontation it produces? And how do the emergent spatial practices in 
post-revolt Athens fit into the broader legacy of uprisings and riots in 
European and American cities more generally? 
These questions must be approached in the context of a more 
generic one—namely: what is the potential of violent crowds to become 
82 agents of change and what might spatial practices linked with this po-  
tential social change look like today? This is a question that has been re- 
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peatedly posed by historians, from Eric Hobsbawm’s (1965) descriptions 
of the “pre-political” urban mobs of medieval cities to E.P. Thompson’s 
analysis of the “moral economy” of crowds in 18th century. A major 
turning point in the “revolutionary” potential of such crowd action oc-
curred between the French Revolution of 1789 and the Paris Commune of 
1871. And yet, at the dawn of the era of bourgeois democracy and 
industrial production, violent crowd action found itself out-manoeuvred by 
urban design (e.g. the so-called “Hausmannization” of Paris as the 
prototype for social control through urban planning),
14
 outdated by 
changes in social stratification, with the crowd’s spontaneity being “in-
compatible with the long-lasting solidarities” (Hobsbawm 1965: 124) of 
the then-emergent working class. It found itself outmoded by the supposed 
evolution of political representation since bourgeois democracy was 
widely considered to be “both an improved substitute for violence and 
altogether incompatible with any form of violence” (Moore 1968: 1). For 
all these reasons you could have expected city mobs, violent crowds, and 
urban riots to have all but vanished: it was for these reasons, in fact, that 
Hobsbawm had announced their “passing.” (1965: 124). 
But in the last decades of the 20th century this idyllic image of 
First World urban politics has been “shattered by spectacular outbursts 
of public unrest, rising ethnic tensions, and mounting destitu tion and 
distress at the heart of large cities” (Wacquant 2008: 18). The examples 
are many: acts of urban rioting have taken place in numerous 
metropolises including Paris (1968); Brixton, London (1981); Los 
Angeles (1992); Bradford, Leeds, and Oldham in the north of England 
(2001); and more recently Paris (2005) and, of course, Athens (2008). 
Academic efforts to grapple with this most recent upsurge of urban 
rioting have focused on the structural causes underlying each instance. 
These range, for example, from the perceived social policy failures  that 
led to the French suburban uprisings of 2005, (see for example Dikeç 
2007), to the interracial tensions that erupted into a string of urban riots 
in the north of England in 2001 (See Amin 2003 and Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008) and the long-standing animosity between police and 
members of the black community that served as backdrop to the 
outpouring of violence in Los Angeles in 1992 (see Baldassare 2004 and 
Jacobs 2000). The dominant approach has been to read acts of rioting 
primarily as responses to particular structural injustices and to focus on 
operations aimed at preventing their re-emergence. But there are reasons 
to think that another perspective, more attuned to spatial dynamics, 
might provide important insights about the legacies of ur  83 
ban riots and revolts. 
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Consider Manuel Castells’s reading of the string of urban riots in 
the US of the 1960s as a form of urban social movement, with participants 
claiming the right to occupy and re-use certain urban spaces (the black 
ghettos) for their own purposes as a key “organizational basis of the 
revolt” (Castells 1983: 53). Individuals and collectivities participating in 
urban riots for this purpose might then be understood to be making a claim 
to a “right to the city” which, in Lefebvre’s original conception, was a call 
for “a radical restructuring of social, political, and economic relations, both 
in the city and beyond” (Lefebvre 1996: 34). This original conception of 
the right involved the capacity to access urban services, but also 
considered a “right to appropriation”—that is, inhabitants’ right “to 
physically access, occupy, and use urban space” (Purcell 2002: 103). 
It is in this conception of the “right to the city” that a fun-
damental political and material-spatial difference between Navarinou 
Park and Ayios Panteleimonas Square can be seen. First of all, the Nazis 
who physically occupied the square lacked the explicit legacy of revolt 
that animated the occupation of Navarinou Park. The Nazis were simply 
reacting to the December event and its legacies, creating a field of 
artificial social tension in an effort to manifest their limited spatial 
and political presence in a city that was briefl overcome by anti-au-
thoritarian revolt. However, and more importantly, the people of Nava-
rinou Park had the power and the will to access, occupy, and radically 
alter the actual materiality of the former parking lot: they tore apart the 
asphalt, planted trees, painted the walls, transformed building walls into 
cinema screens, and threw away metal and plastic fences. In short, the 
people involved in Navarinou Park turned the site into a lived space, 
organically integrated into the life of Exarcheia while at the same time 
reflecting and affecting political developments in the country. On the 
other hand, by preventing migrants and anti-Nazi inhabitants from being 
in the square and using the playground, the Nazis in Ayios Pan-
teleimonas altered none of the established materialities of the square’s 
space. This was because they lacked the social legitimacy and power that 
the revolt offered to the Navarinou Park people and because, together 
with government forces, they concentrated exclusively on the politics of 
representation and symbolism rather than on the politics of lived urban 
space. The most that the authoritarian occupiers of Ayios Panteleimonas 
can stand for is the fragmented and local right of Greeks to use the 
square as opposed to foreigners, establishing a regime of fear and violent 
discrimination: a single-issue politics materialised with a 
84 very passive and limited spatial practice—that is, closure and fencing of  
the site where they want to root their explicit political project. 
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In contrast, the Navarinou Park project has reached beyond the 
representations of what can be achieved without the intervention of the 
state and when people self-organise. It is a spatial-material legacy of the 
revolt but it is now also a lived everyday space with a constant flow of 
people and events. Integrated within a broader framework of post-
revolt political potential in Greece, it is open both socially and spatially 
to the transformations in Athens after the uprising. This becomes clear in 
light of the most recent police raid on the park that took place in April 
2010, only days before the loan agreement between the Greek 
government and the International Monetary Fund, the European Central 
Bank, and the European Union.
15
 
In December 2008, popular consent for the post-dictatorial 
political settlement broke down rapidly and spectacularly, bringing a 
simmering political crisis to boil; at its core was a rapidly fading faith in 
the political legitimacy of the Greek state and its apparatuses. Since the 
December revolt the Greek state has been confronted with some very 
tangible ruptures. Several segments of the population have emerged from 
December more confident about the potential of their own political 
identities and projects, which have a strong anti-state and anti-
authoritarian character. Many of these post-December political subjects 
were brought together through the Navarinou Park occupation. While this 
site may be a relatively minor instance of urban reclamation, it 
nevertheless represents a significant resistance-scape
16
 that poses a 
tangible danger for the Greek authorities and their political crisis (now 
presented as a fiscal one) because of its potential to evolve into a much 
broader escalation by some of the most progressive and militant elements 
of society. 
Governance in the post-dictatorial period has alternated between 
the two main political parties, which have bred nepotism, large-scale 
corruption, and enabled the domination of the political landscape by a small 
number of families. The shifting of attention to narrow financial-
administrative issues in the current moment can be read as an attempt by 
political elites to distract attention from this long-standing political crisis 
that was expressed so dramatically in the December revolt. Since October 
2009, when PASOK came to power, an attempt has been made to create a 
war-like atmosphere of financial emergency. The state has exploited this 
sense of crisis to characterize protests, strikes, occupations, and similar 
actions as being not only opposed to the government and financial elites, 
but also to some imaginary common (“national”) good. 
On the night of April 12, 2010—one day after arranging the 85 
details of a major loan from the IMF, the ECB, and the EU (the so - 
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called Troika, see Glossary)—Greek authorities sent hundreds of police 
special forces to raid the Navarinou Park where they beat up and detained 
more than seventy people. Because of its potential as a base from which 
the new policies and measures related to the Government-Troika deal 
could be opposed, the very first target the Greek state chose was the 
park. What defines the park is that it openly questions the consent that 
Greek authorities—along with the Troika—request from large segments of 
the society to work more, to be paid less and to come under increased 
surveillance. The park shows the possibilities of spatialising resistance and 
the potential of a radical conception of the “right to the city.” 
While many urban political groups from the left have invoked a 
version of this right to the city, the term has too often been mobilized in 
precisely the ways that Lefebvre would have warned against—that is, in 
the terms of single-issue politics. Even worse, the “right to the city” has at 
times signalled a narrowing of political forms from the global and national 
to the regional (specifically, the urban) arena—or even as an imagined 
exit from the milieu of politics altogether. In this sense Mark Purcell is 
quite right to point out that the right to the city has often been 
misinterpreted to describe groups applying “fragmented, tactical, or 
piecemeal resistance” (Purcell 2002: 101). Citizen groups looking to create 
more green spaces in their neighbourhood, for example, could do so in the 
name of a common good and as an act that is apparently not political, since 
it does not seem to produce any immediate political confrontation. Surely 
everyone is in favour of planting a tree! 
Indeed, there are good examples today in which to see both the 
pitfalls and the potential of claims to the right to the city. For example, 
Critical Mass bike rides are seen by some of their participants as little 
more than a means to carve out space for bicycles to share the road with 
other vehicles: the right for yet another transport vehicle (the bicycle) to 
exist side-by-side with the emblematic vehicle of capitalist culture, the car. 
But this reading misses how these mass demonstrations can function as a 
challenge to the culture of capitalism. Within a broader political 
framework, the Critical Mass ride might serve as a key challenge to the 
legitimacy of an icon of capitalist culture: the socially isolating and 
environmentally destructive car and its capacity to provide the capitalist 
system with constant and speedy flows of people and commodities. 
Critical Mass rides—by the sheer volume of their participants, their 
slowed-down pace, and their attack on the individuality imposed by car 
transportation—challenge inherent and fundamental elements of 
86 capitalism and hierarchy more than many traditional demonstrations  
ever manage to do. 
8 Haunt of Albanian Migrants, “These Days Are Ours, Too,” n.d. Available at http:// 87 
www.occupiedlondon.org/blog/2008/12/15/these-days-are-ours-too/ 
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As we saw in the example of Navarinou Park the “right to the 
city” is not about rights, and it is not about cities; at least, it is not ex-
clusively about either. If fragmented and narrowly understood “rights” 
were this concept’s only criteria, then the Nazis’ claim for the exclusive 
right of Greek citizens to access and use of the square and the playground 
might also qualify. The Navarinou Park version of the right to the city is 
much closer to more radical conceptions of a “collective human right” that 
have, according to David Harvey, emerged throughout history as 
responses to the fact that most notions of human rights “do not 
fundamentally challenge hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market logics, 
or the dominant modes of legality and state action” (Harvey 2008). 
What has been happening in Athens since December 2008, then, 
is an attempt by some of the participants in the December uprising to 
make their own claim to the city, and through this process to subvert the 
authority of the state over everyday life and to experience an unmediated 
and unobstructed fulfilment of their needs and desires. This is no small 
order and, for this reason, the authorities’ crackdown on these spaces 
should come as no surprise. After all, it is there, outside the margins set 
by authority, that the legacy of the 2008 revolt can be fought for and 
where it can be materialized on an everyday level. 
NOTES 
1 An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Upping the Anti 10. 
2 See Part 2. The Event: December. 
3 For an extensive discussion of the role of independent in media see the article by 
Metropolitan Sirens in this volume. 
4 “Years of riots, clashes with police in Greece,” http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUKTRE4B61DW20081208. 
5 “Greek police shooting sparks riot,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 
7769710.stm. 
6 Helena Smith “In Athens, middle-class rioters are buying rocks. This chaos isn’t over,” 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/14/greece-riots-youth-poverty-comment. 
7 “Children of the Revolution,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/22/ civil-
unrest-athens. 
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9 Articles that report on the opening of the park appeared by and large in the mainstream 
press, e.g. http://www.lifo.gr/mag/features/1280 while some publications have also covered 
the state of repression the park quickly encountered, e.g. “Athens Voice,” 
http://www.athensvoice.gr/the-paper/article/284/. 
10 The term neo-Nazi is used relatively loosely here. Those involved in Ayios 
Panteleimonas include both neo-Nazi skinheads and more mainstream extreme right-wing 
nationalists. Golden Dawn is a small neo-Nazi organisation that openly participates in 
elections as a national-socialist party. Its agenda, aesthetics, and violent practices and 
discourses follow the international trend of Nazism. Along with the skinheads of Golden 
Dawn, there are various other extreme-right wing populist politicians in Greece with their 
own groups, press, and followers. These organisations trace their political origin to the 
Greek junta (1967–1974) and its para-state apparatuses. Several of these extreme right-
wing populists hold positions in the full spectrum of right-wing parties. The most distinct 
extreme right-wing parliamentary party is the “Popular Orthodox Alert” (LA.O.S). 
However Nea Dimokratia (which governed the country between 2004 and 2009) includes 
several extreme right-wing populist politicians. These “patriotic forces” often ally with 
one another to promote common issues. 
11 “Two new attacks on migrants,” Ioanna Sotirchou in the Eleftherotypia, 26 August 
2009b [in Greek] http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=76200. 
12 The social-democratic PASOK government was quick to rename the “Ministry of Public 
Order” the “Ministry of Citizen Protection”—with the ministry’s roles intact, including the 
command of the country’s police and Coastguard forces. 
13 The vice-minister was referring to the Montmartre district of Paris, which used to be a 
bohemian part of the French capital. Since the end of World War II it has been gentrified 
and is today one of the most popular tourist destinations in the city. 
14 Baron Haussmann’s radical renovation of Paris (1852–1870) involved, for example, the 
replacement of the city’s medieval alleys with wide boulevards that cut through traditional 
working-class neighbourhoods while providing security forces swift access to the city—
invaluable in the case of social unrest. 
15 Only days before the final corrections and submission of this article, the first draft of 
which was initially written in spring 2009. 
16 “Resistance-scape” refers to sites that overcome the ephemeral nature dominating 
several of the RtC-related activities. Resistance-scapes are being developed within the 
framework of the RtC activities, but they are becoming materially and spatially durable and 
form explicit resistance discourses and practices. 
